have stated .... I can conceive of no useful object to be served in foisting upon the public this mass ofjunk, 3 In the process of deciding that Arthur Watson Hyde Pinion had failed to properly establish a charitable trust, the Court of Appeal found itself caught between a judicial rock and a hard place. Courts have always asserted that they do not indulge in matters of taste or artistic quality -connoisseurship -when they are required to deal with art, irrespective of the area of law in which they have to engage. But in this decision, buttressed, it must be said, with the views of expert witnesses, Harmon LJ could not hold back from expressing the inexpressible -the judgment had to be based on the character and quality of a collection of art and other
objects. His Lordship continues:
Where a museum is concerned and the utility of the gift is brought in question it is, in my opinion, and herein I agree with the judge, essential to know at least something of the quality of the proposed exhibits in order to judge whether they will be conducive to the education of the public. So I think with a public library, such a place if found to be devoted entirely to works of pornography or of a corrupting nature, would not be allowable ... there is a strong body of evidence here that as a means of education this collection is worthless. The testator's own paintings, of which there are over 50, are said by competent persons to be in an academic style and 'atrociously bad' and the other pictures without exception worthless. Even the so-called Lely turns out to be a 20th century copy.
Apart from pictures there is a haphazard assembly -it does not merit the name collection, for no purpose emerges, no time nor style is illustrated -of furniture and objects of so-called art about which expert opinion is unanimous that nothing beyond the third-rate is to be found. Indeed one of the experts expresses his surprise that so voracious a collector should not by hazard have picked up even one meritorious object. The most that a skilful cross-examination extracted from the expert witnesses was that there were a dozen chairs which might perhaps be acceptable to a minor provincial museum and perhaps another dozen not 3 Re Pinion [1965] 1 Ch 85,106. altogether worthless, but two dozen chairs do not make a museum and they must to accord with the will be exhibited stifled by a large number of absolutely worthless pictures and objects. 4 It was junk, or in Davies LJs view, an 'intolerable deal ofrubbish,.5 Not surprisingly, the gift failed. These outraged sentiments -'junk' and 'rubbish' are not unemotive terms -may be seen to be exceptional, able to be confined to the 'facts' of this type of case, and the special position held by courts in equity. And, surely, Harman LJ was simply approving of the evidence of the experts, without more? I do not think so; Re Pinion drips with an unmitigated distaste for the deceased Mr Pinion and his collection -'junk' and 'rubbish' are not the words of the experts but of the court itself.
I will suggest that the heightened language emanating from this 1964 decision exposes a more generally disguised judicial connoisseurship that inhabits most cases dealing with art. I have intentionally chosen not to define this concept at this stage of the article, but will return to its character and influence later. 6 But for the law itself, the decision stands for the imposition of a particular type of aesthetic sensibility in relation to the establishment of charitable trusts for the establishment ofmuseums. 7 Anything other than an accepted 'canon of taste' has the potential to be found wanting. The decision, in an oblique way, echoes infamous exclusionary exhibitions, which failed to meet accepted canons of taste such as the (Cth) to refuse the grant of an export permit for a painting depicting a colonial scene. In deciding that the Minister was correct to refuse the permit, the AAT waxed lyrical over the subject painting -View ofthe Town ofSydney dated between 1799 and 1802 -and its aesthetic qualities, when tested against the quality of another lesser quality painting dealing with the same subject matter -Sydney Capital. The case hung on the question of aesthetics, and a clash between two sets of experts. Mr McCormick for the applicant seeking the grant of the export permit liked both paintings, but considered neither to be 'fine' art:
We're not talking artistic merit, we're not talking about J and W is that 'seeing' is a matter of choice, to achieve an instrumental result.
In other words, the facts of the art cases, and how they are seen and then read, rely on an aesthetic in order to achieve the 'right' result. 14 It does not take much imagination to think that Mr Pinion was trying to create his museum to avoid providing for the members of his family -but the case rendered his will intestate. Whatever the quality of the art, the result would have been the same. In the case of the Sydney paintings, the thought that rare Australian art would be lost to Australia means that Sydney Capital, the lesser work, would also have been refused an export permit, albeit on different grourJds.
balls ofstring: knowing what to lookfor
It is a curious thing that these two paintings of Sydney and Mr Pinion's much maligned, 'atrociously bad', paintings have something in common, aside from the intrusion of the courts into questions of aesthetics and connoisseurship. Neither of the paintings concerned rated as 'high' art or 'fine' art, yet the paintings of Sydney are redeemed by their rarity (only three or four extant pieces exist of The Rocks area of Sydney at the time), and the distance of time.
Similarly, no one inRe Pinion thought for a moment that the rubbish and junk ofMr Pinion's 'collection' might have an educative purpose (if in nothing less than as an exploration of 'what non-art looks like') and no-one saw that a time might come when it might be prized for something that could not be seen in the here and now. 
How to view an art object -facing facts
The only difference between these 'snapshot' cases, and most other cases involving art is that they belie the language of indifference and avoidance that inhabits most cases involving judicial engagement with art and its cultural products. Yet, despite the cases used in the snapshots at the start of this article, most law in the area is based on an express purported avoidance by the courts of creative intention, aesthetics, cultural value or quality. Court is in no way concerned with the merits of the portrait (which are generally agreed to be high, unlike the subject of at least one earlier set of proceedings involving the Archibald Prize). The sole issue for the Court as a court of equity is whether the award was in breach of the terms of the charitable trust in the execution of which the first defendant awarded the prize.
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Fair enough. They are simply reiterating and relying on the assertion of Holmes J in the US copyright case of Bleistein v Donaldson Lithography Co,n and the common law approach generally: that courts 'stay out' of decision-making about art, culture and aesthetics.
28
Holmes J, the great pragmatist, took the view that judges are ill-qualified to make such decisions. At one level, as the snapshot cases suggest, it is not hard to see some very good reasons to adopt this position, but it does not assure the 'safety' of decisions made about art.
This position was reiterated by Kirby J in an extra-judicial article about the approaches adopted by the courts when judging art in the context of a dispute over the Archibald Prize, a case to which I will return later in this article.
29
The snapshot cases are exceptions in one sense alone. The courts actually said what was going on in their minds. It is plain that the courts must make decisions about art, whatever the situation or area of law, and make choices about the image in question. I suggest that they hope that the (stated) employment of a robust commonsense, rather than aesthetics, in their decision-making will immunise them from the criticism that they have been actively involved in an aesthetic or connoisseurial exercise. But, rather than avoiding connoisseurship, the courts are actively engaged in making aesthetic and connoisseurial decisions. 30 The facts, as the crits and Jerome Frank would have it, are always malleable and will always be used to achieve an end. But 'facts' are far from anodyne; the way the law 'sees' art fundamentally affects the interpretation and construction of the law. The choices made by the courts to shift one way or another in the finding of 'facts' will, even though concealed through the veil of denial and avoidance, actively contribute to the decision-making in these cases through choices about what is or is not 'seen'.3 3 By occluding inconvenient features of art objects and images, or by reconstructing and reinstantiating the means by which art objects and images are created or constructed, the courts make active choices, even when they assert a passive indifference to the character or quality of the images or objects with which they must engage. The discomfit and discomfort of the courts (whether feigned and genuine -sometimes, it seems, judges do protest too much!) when dealing with art belies their active use of either aesthetics or connoisseurship. In short, assertions that they do not engage in matters of taste belie their active involvement in choices about the 'facts' of art.
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Rather than being a mere side show to the important business of interpreting the law, how the courts see the objects and images in front of them is central to the development of doctrine, as well as the decision-making process applicable to the case at hand, as the decision in Re Pinion makes amply clear. But more problematically, through the denial of any engagement in aesthetics, I suggest that the courts potentially undertake a textual 'recreation' of the object or image, which will result in its reinscription -far from an outcome based in disinterest or disengagement. In other words, the act ofjudging imposes a reading of an object by the very act of not reading, and in doing so fundamentally rewrites the object as a text. In doing so, I
suggest that the courts, rather than acting in a disinterested fashion, are doing far more than they claim. This was a contract for the sale of goods. There was a mistake about the quality of the subject-matter, because both parties believed the picture to be a Constable, and that mistake was in one sense essential or fundamental. Such a mistake, however, does not avoid the contract. There was no mistake about the subjectmatter of the sale. It was a specific picture of 'Salisbury Cathedral'. The parties were agreed in the same terms on the same subject-matter, and that is sufficient to make a contract
Creation and recreation
In this case, the painting, thought to be by Constable turned out to be a fake. John Constable, a key figure in the emergence of a particular type of British landscape painting, is known for his use of light and shade, sky, and an early type of impressionism. The subject matter, what
Denning LJ chose to look at, did not make the painting, though the image of the cathedral made it the painting on which the bargain was struck. By recasting the image into what it depicts, it was possible to avoid any question of a potential mistake about the contract. Instead, it was recast as a pleasing picture of an image of a cathedral rather than reading the text of the painting within its wider parameters as containing the hand of the master painter (or in this case, to contain the hand of the faker).
[1950] 2 KB 86
Yet its fame is based in part on its creator -Constable -and the purchaser and seller did not think they were buying a picture of a pleasing image. They thought they were buying 'a Constable'. The visual object was foregrounded, but in this case, it was not vital in the minds of the people involved in the transaction. The court 're-read' the object, this time to make it more important than the other factors involved in the sale, namely, the artist who painted the picture.
Two lines and a face a painting does not make

In the UK copyright case of Merchandising Corp ofAmerica Inc v Harbond Ltd,38 the' Adam
Ant case', Lawton LJ refused to give copyright protection to Adam Ant's face paint, because it was not 'a painting'; instead, a painting 'is an object; and paint without a surface is not a painting' .39 Rather than look at the totality of image or face and the two lines, the court extracted the two lines of paint from the overall text of the image ie Adam Ant with face paint. This time, the court 'reconstructed' the visual image so that it was divorced from the context of the face on which the lines were painted, rather than the whole composition of two lines on Adam Ant's face. It was not hard to then find that the two lines on the face were simply 'ideas' and failed to meet the expectation of a copyright work that it constituted expressIOn.
Both of these cases are characterised by their reinscription of the image -on the one hand as subject-matter alone and on the other as element or idea alone. I suggest in doing so they recreate or re-render the object or image through the choice of elements on which the eye lingered -the cathedral in the former case, the lines in the latter. In Panofsky's terms,40 the courts have misinterpreted the basic premise on which the work must be read, by reinstantiating the image in question. They have then, in both iconographic and iconological terms, denuded the images of any meaning. It is by denying anything other than those elements of the image on which the court chooses to focus that the image will be remade to achieve the desired outcome in the case -in this case, to avoid a breach of contract or copyright protection. rather than the whole, rewrites or re-renders the image into something meaningless and valueless. By engaging in this style of seeing (especially in the guise of commonsense or dispassion) the court is actively involved in the reading and making of images. In short, the courts are engaging in connoisseurship -of the 18 th century kind.
Painting or drawing: the 2004 Archibald Prize
But is this always the case? In those rare situations where art is put 'on trial', or art is seen for art's sake, rather than some other engagement with commerce or transactional issues, the courts may break with 18 th century connoisseurship, but cannot avoid engaging with art as an 45 Ibid P 173.
aesthetic concept. The references to the Brancusi sculpture 46 and the Piss Christ 47 blasphemy case are two examples of the courts positively engaging with art, without adopting the language or tone of connoisseurship. In the former, an aesthetic sensibility was relied upon, and in the latter, the issue of the artistic value of the image was avoided altogether. I will suggest that the approach adopted by Hamilton J in Johansen v Art Gallery of NSW was fundamentally an aesthetic judgment, not a connoisseurial judgment of the kind based in a louche, untutored critical judge of art or taste which characterised the approaches adopted in
RePinion.
Instead, Hamilton J overtly explored the merits of the image and its manner of creation, through its characterisation as a painting. In the process of working through the merits of the image, the judgment became 'judgement' about the work as a whole, involving an exploration of fundamental questions about what made the image and its creation a painting.
In doing so, the judgment came face to face with the way in which art is created and the nature of its practice. Rather than treating the image and its creation as 'good' or 'bad' -the approach used in Re Pinion, for instance, Hamilton J explored the modes of creation and consequence for the viewer of the image of David Gulpilil; in short, a judg/e/ment of the aesthetics of the picture. 48 The aesthetics involved, however, are limited to the register of fact, based in part on expert evidence, but more especially framed through the language and approach used in the judge's reasoning.
So, as in the other cases, my focus is again on 'facts', but this time acting as a prelude to their use in establishing the framework and groundwork for the law. And what a very surprising result emerged from this mix ofjudgement, judgment, and reasoning.
Controversies
It almost could not be an Archibald Prize without some kind of controversy occurring. In It is the observation about the discernable nature of part of the image as paint, and not as drawing, that is striking, as well as the general tone of the description of the process involved. In other words, Hamilton J is, without reference to expert assistance, making a 'judgement' about the character of a work, and how it is created. Of course, there are any number of painters who never draw a line, and would never draw a line. But as a way to open the door to protect the Ruddy piece as 'painted', it is a master stroke. Hamilton J reached the only conclusion possible:
I have reached the conclusion that minds may well differ as to whether, if the picture must be placed in a single category, that category should be 'painting' or 'drawing'. But, in view of those matters, I find it impossible on any objective basis to exclude the portrait from the category of a work which has been 'painted', which is the real issue here.
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Thus, the trustees of the Art Gallery of New South Wales, who were responsible for awarding the prize, had acted within the terms of the trust, and had awarded the prize to a portrait that had been 'painted'. There were no grounds on which to find that they had not properly exercised their duties, so the prize could not be interfered with.
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There is one other matter to tidy up, however. I reach this conclusion without reference to the expert evidence given in this case.
But to any extent to which I could properly advert to it, that evidence would but fortify my conclusion. ... There could be no clearer demonstration that the picture could be characterised in either way and that, whichever characterisation was made, it was a matter ofjudgment or opinion. 59 him to avoid the inevitable conclusion about the status of the image. It -the image -was painted, but the portrait wasn't. However, to disavow having made a decision when a decision sat in the text of the judgment was, to put it colloquially, a cop-out. Having come so far in the judgment, Hamilton J had to stop before he tipped over the edge, to overtly make a finding of fact that was, in effect, an aesthetic 'judgement'. At the very tipping point, he stopped the process of judg/e/ing. He chose not to find that the picture was painted, even though he in fact does. He nearly decided to judge the art in question, which would have resulted in a breakthrough for law, where a judge would actually say what the art was, rendering for the courts a stake in judging images aesthetically, not connoisseurially. But he didn't step over the threshold. He kept back on the law's side of the canvas, by not even finding as a fact that the image was painted. If he had had to, he would have had to acknowledge that the portrait wasn't painted. He let the image and the portrait off the hook by avoiding looking at the detail of the image. A connoisseurial judge would not have allowed this detail to be overlooked. And ever so quietly, by avoiding finding facts, Hamilton J managed to elude the traps courts can fall into when they subject images to the techniques and prejudices of the monkey with the magnifying glass.
